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POLITICS AND PUNISHMENT: REACTIONS TO MARKEL'S POLITICAL
RETRIBUTIVISM
Michael T Cahill"
I commend the editors and advisors of this journal for making such
an excellent selection for its inaugural featured author. Dan Markel is not
only one of the most thoughtful and prolific of the emerging generation of
criminal-law scholars, but also a diligent and supportive colleague to the
other members of that cohort, including myself. Through both his own
work and his thorough and insightful comments on and reactions to the
work of others, he is sure to be one of the most significant and influential
thinkers in this area for years to come. Moreover, the kind of work he is
pursuing is in the vanguard of contemporary trends in punishment theory.
He belongs to a group of current theorists who are bringing to bear not
only moral theory (as has long been done), but also political theory, to
help address important fundamental questions about the proper scope and
attributes of criminal law. That is a significant intellectual project, and he
is among those at the forefront of it.
In response to the article that forms this symposium's centerpiece,
I would like to discuss two general sets of issues-less concerns than
questions about aspects or implications of Markel's views that might not
yet be entirely resolved. The first relates to his views of the justification of
punishment. The second, which I will discuss more briefly, relates to his
understanding of the political institutions that are tasked with imposing
punishment.
First, the general question of punishment. It bears noting that the
confrontational conception of retributivism ("CCR") theory presented in
the article offers a bold and provocative answer to the fundamental
question of how punishment is to be justified and when it is to be applied.
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law
School. I am very grateful to the student editors of the Virginia Journal of Criminal Law
for inviting me to participate in this written symposium and in the conference held at the
University of Virginia School of Law on April 7, 2011, as well as for their logistical and
editorial support. Particular thanks are due to Daniel Ross for overseeing the
administrative details of the event. Thanks also to my fellow participants in that
conference: Dan Markel, Josh Bowers, Darryl Brown, and Antony Duff.
Politics and Punishment
As is well known, there are thought to be two standard so-called "theories
of punishment,"' each of which gives a different answer to the question of
when and whom to punish: retributivist theory claims that punishment is
justified as a response to moral wrongdoing, and utilitarian (or
consequentialist or deterrence) theory claims that punishment is justified
as a means of preventing harm.
Markel's CCR theory2 says something different. Fundamentally it
claims that criminals merit punishment not because they committed a
moral wrong (per se), or because they caused or risked harm (per se), but
rather because they broke the law. We might say that retributivists (at least
"standard issue" retributivists) are concerned with moral wrongs;
deterrence theorists are concerned with social harms; and the CCR is
concerned with legal violations. Of course, all three of these categories
overlap to a great degree. Conduct that is morally wrongful often causes or
risks harm; conduct that causes or risks harm tends to be considered
morally wrongful; and both of those categories of conduct tend to be
criminalized on one, or the other, or both bases. Even so, the CCR sets out
a significantly distinct answer to the question of when and why
punishment is acceptable or appropriate.
Given its distinctive formulation, a question arises immediately: is
the CCR truly a retributivist theory? Markel says it is;3 Josh Bowers, in
response, says it is not.4 They might both be right. Markel defends his
theory as retributive in part by contrasting it to what it is not: he maintains
it does not justify punishment in terms of its beneficial consequences (and
is therefore not a consequentialist theory), but rather in terms of its
intrinsic goodness5 (and is therefore a retributive theory). The CCR may
1 For a brief discussion of these two theories and other possible theories, as well
as why the term "theory of punishment" is a misnomer for them, see Michael T. Cahill,
Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH. U. L. REv. 815, 817-20 & n.5 (2007).
2 See Dan Markel, Retributive Justice and the Demands of Democratic
Citizenship, 1 VA. J. CRIM. L. 1, 5 (2012).
3 See id. at 18-19.
4 See Josh Bowers, Blame by Proxy: Political Retributivism & Its Problems, A
Response to Dan Markel, 1 VA. J. CRIM. L. 135, 137-48 (2012).
I take the claim to be not that the offender has injured something that is
intrinsically good, see id at 139-40, but rather that imposing punishment on the offender
is itself intrinsically good: that punishment has features that directly and necessarily
vindicate important and normatively desirable goals. See e.g., Markel, supra note 2, at 27
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share a formal similarity to typical retributivist theories insofar as it
identifies an intrinsic good (actually, in Markel's case, multiple intrinsic
goods) that might serve as a "cancelling condition" to the standard
objection in the face of which punishment is said to need justification:
namely, that punishment causes suffering. 6 At the same time, only one of
the three features of this intrinsic-good claim-holding offenders
accountable-looks substantively similar to the desert claim asserted by
retributivists to make retributive justice intrinsically good. Markel's other
intrinsic-good claims, promoting equal liberty and democratic self-
defense, bear less (or at least less obvious) resemblance to the usual
retributivist justification.
We might say then that Markel advances a political
non-consequentialist justification of punishment that has retributive
features, or values a form of retributive justice, but does not fixate on
("Importantly, in a liberal democratic polity, the imposition of state punishment, P, upon
A for doing B is intrinsically good regardless of the independent contingent benefits that
might accompany P from a crime control perspective. . . . Taken together, communicative
punishment practices form an intrinsic good it does not rely on contingent crime control
benefits or vigilantism prevention or other utilitarian advantages such as the net
satisfaction of preferences of particular victims." (footnote omitted)).
I think it is more appropriate and useful to say not that punishment is an intrinsic
good, but that punishment has features that are intrinsically good, or that punishment (at
least when it satisfies certain conditions) produces an intrinsic good. The hallmark of the
consequentialist retributivist, in my view, is the claim that retributive justice (as distinct
from punishment itself) is an intrinsic good. See Cahill, supra note 1. Retributive
punishment's promotion of that good, in turn, counts as a mark in favor of such
punishment, independent of any other benefits or good consequences (such as harm
prevention) that might also follow from punishment. This differs from the claim that
retributive punishment is a moral duty (the classic assertion of deontological
retributivism) and also from the claim that retribution has no value whatever (the claim of
standard utilitarian consequentialism).
The case for punishment as a mechanism for promoting a good becomes
stronger if one further asserts that where punishment is called for, only punishment is
able to generate that good. In that case, punishment remains a means, but is a necessary
means, of promoting the good in question: something inherent in the act of punishing
makes it the only appropriate vehicle for realizing this good, in the same way that a
"positive" deontological retributivist would see punishment as not only a proper but a
necessary response to wrongdoing (but would frame that response as satisfying a moral
duty rather than as promoting a good).
6 See Mitchell N. Berman, Punishment and Justification, 118 ETHICS 258, 266-71
(2008).
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retribution (in the sense of accountability commensurate with moral
desert) as the justification of punishment in the way that typical
retributivist accounts do. It might be accurate to describe the theory as
retributive, but not retributivist. Markel hopes to distinguish the theory
from other retributivist accounts by adding the qualifier "political," but
even that might not fully reflect the normative pluralism I take
(approvingly) to undergird Markel's account.
I am not convinced, however, that the CCR's derivation from, or
connection to, political concerns makes it an instrumentalist theory,7
precisely because Markel is trying to offer an account of: (1) what makes
punishment of offenders good (and the failure to punish offenders bad)
intrinsically, not merely as a beneficial side effect; and (2) what makes
punishment good in each instance, not merely in the aggregate. Markel
claims that the values of accountability, equality, and democratic
self-defense explain and justify punishment at the retail, not merely the
wholesale, level. Each time we punish an offender we vindicate those
values, and each time we fail to punish an offender (or do punish a non-
offender), we undermine them. Indeed, Markel's theory might operate
mainly at the retail level, as he provides an explanation of why it is
proper8 that we punish specific criminal acts, but says little about which
acts to criminalize in the first place. 9
Having sorted out the general nature of the theory as I broadly
understand it, the next question is: why adopt such a theory? Why should
we think that lawbreaking per se, as opposed to wrongdoing or harm,
Cf Bowers, supra note 4, at 137-39 ("Markel has almost convinced me that his
theory is not the quasi-consequentialist approach I once took it to be. Nevertheless, I still
detect the occasional instrumental drift to his article. . . . [Markel's values are] 'political
values,' and there is nothing intrinsically retributive (or even moral) about political
values. . . . [T]he political question is both instrumental and aggregative, while the
retributive question is normative and contextualized. That is, a retributive punishment
theory is unconcerned with aggregate social consequences." (footnote omitted)).
I use this term to avoid expressing any strong position as to whether imposing
punishment consistent with the CCR should best be seen as acceptable, or obligatory, or
(as Markel most often seems to say) morally demanded but only defeasibly so.
9 See the discussion of the limited "fallibility conditions" for criminal law in
Markel, supra note 2, at 77-81.
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provides a suitable basis for punishment? 0 As alluded to above, the CCR
provides three answers to that question, claiming that this focus promotes:
(1) the accountability of the offender; (2) a regime of equal liberty; and
(3) democratic self-defense." Those are all good answers, insofar as they
are all good things. I am certainly in favor of all of them, and all else
equal, I would support a system of punishment that achieved them and
oppose a system that undermined them. It seems possible, however, that
those three goals or justifications may sometimes be in tension with each
other.
To frame things somewhat differently than Markel does, there are
two basic kinds of reasons why we might say that lawbreaking as such-
rather than moral wrongdoing or social harm-offers a proper basis for
punishment. These two categories replicate, in modified form, the two
usual grounds that people give for punishment, offering two different
claims about why lawbreaking per se justifies punishment. If (and only if)
either or both of these claims are true, lawbreaking as such could provide
an appropriate basis for punishment.
The first possible claim is that lawbreaking creates a desert basis
for punishing the offender, i.e., that an individual who unreasonably
violates a legal prohibition merits punishment for that reason, with no
further explanation or justification necessary. I take the first of the three
rationales supporting the CCR-promoting offender accountability-to be
making this kind of claim, i.e., that punishment holds offenders
accountable for their offenses, and such accountability is in itself a
desirable thing.12 As noted above, this is similar to, but quite distinct from,
the standard retributivist claim, which relies on a desert basis of a different
kind: namely, that conduct deserves punishment by virtue of being
wrongful, rather than unlawful.
10 Note that "punishment" as used here is distinct from "suffering" or "hardship,"
for it refers to a specific institutional practice, as discussed in the text below.
1 See Markel, supra note 2, at 5-6.
12 In my view, the claim might be stronger (not only in emphasis but in its
analytical force) if it asserted that only punishment enables such accountability, see supra
note 5, but Markel does not take this position. See Dan Markel & Chad Flanders,
Bentham on Stilts: The Bare Relevance of Subjectivity to Retributive Justice, 98 CAL. L.
REv. 907, 939 n.122 (2010).
Politics and Punishment
Importantly, and this is something Markel emphasizes, reliance on
lawbreaking rather than wrongdoing as the linchpin of the desert claim
makes the CCR an account about the justification of punishment
specifically, rather than suffering.13 By contrast, the moral retributivist's
account seems to explain why a wrongdoer would deserve to suffer, but
does not necessarily explain why the wrongdoer must suffer at the hands
of the state via the mechanism of criminal justice. Moral wrongdoing is
pre-legal and pre-political; if there were no government or no
criminal-justice system to impose punishment, wrongful conduct would
still be wrongful, and the wrongdoer would at least arguably still merit the
same degree of hardship or suffering by virtue of his wrongdoing. Even
where a criminal-justice system exists, it is not clear why that system is
the only appropriate agent to impose deserved hardship or suffering on
wrongdoers. The CCR account, on the other hand, provides a reason to see
the state as an indispensable part of the equation: lawbreaking is an affront
against the moral, not just the practical, authority of the liberal democratic
state in particular, which thereby merits a response from the state in
particular.
An issue arises from the claim that lawbreaking, as such, merits
punishment. Normally, when moral retributivists say wrongdoing deserves
punishment (or suffering), they are speaking of culpable wrongdoing, and
they take the view that the degree of deserved punishment tracks the
degree of the wrongdoer's culpability. If the CCR is relying on a similar
desert claim, I wonder whether that suggests or implies a similar view. In
this case, the lawbreaker's degree of deserved punishment should relate in
some way to her culpability as to lawbreaking-not just as to the conduct
being performed, or as to its circumstances or possible results (these
would bear on one's moral culpability), but specifically as to the illegality
of the conduct. If the unique and significant thing that merits punishment
is lawbreaking per se, then it might follow that inadvertent lawbreaking
(meaning inadvertent as to the illegality of the offending conduct)
generates no deserved punishment. After all, the "offender" in that
situation is not culpably, or by choice, disrespecting the state's authority.
On the other hand, deliberate lawbreaking-a conscious decision to
violate a legal norm-would seem to merit greater punishment on this
account, as it flouts the state's authority, directly disrespecting, and on
3 See Markel, supra note 2, at 21-24.
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some level rebelling against, the polity and the people. Perhaps the
strongest reading of Markel along these lines would interpret the CCR as
holding that every crime amounts to, and is punishable precisely because it
amounts to, a low-grade act of treason. 14 Indeed, Markel sometimes
speaks this way, referring to crimes as rebellions against the state.15
Even if not intending to be quite as bold as that, Markel at least
describes his account as one that punishes those who somehow choose to
break the law, which hints that he does think only culpable violations (i.e.,
culpable qua unlawfulness, not just culpable qua offense elements) merit
punishment.16 It is unclear whether such culpability might be relevant, if
indeed it is relevant at all, only to the acceptability of punishment vel non,
or whether it also affects the proper amount of punishment, such that
offenses involving greater degrees of culpability as to criminality merit
greater punishment than otherwise similar offenses.
Take a favorite example of Markel's, the person eating on the
subway. Suppose someone boards a subway train with a jumbo-sized
bucket of fried chicken and shouts:
I refuse to abide by this dumb law against eating on the
subway-even if it is dumb but not illiberal! I will eat
where I please, and no legislature will tell me otherwise!
To signal my opposition, I will now eat this bucket of
chicken! Just watch me, you conformist sheep!
Such a person seems especially culpable, not only as to the act of eating
on the subway, but as to the very consideration that seems to animate
Markel's theory: the fact that he is violating a duly enacted piece of
legislation to which he owes respect. One might think he is thus more
14 Cf Stephen P. Garvey, Are Attempts Like Treason?, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 173,
176 (2011).
15 See Markel, supra note 2, at 38 ("[The offender] is, in a manner, supporting or
implicitly fomenting a rebellion. . . ."); id. at 40 (referring to "offenders who have
wrongly rebelled against the liberal democratic order"); id. at 27 (referring to offenses as
"low-level rebellions or usurpations of decision-making authority").
1 See e.g., id. at 79 (referring to offender's "unreasonable flouting, which
implicitly manifests a disrespect to the endeavor of democracy").
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deserving of being held accountable, under the CCR, than another citizen
who violates the law with reluctance and regret.
This view, of course, generates some curious and perhaps
problematic results. First, it suggests that acts of civil disobedience are
somehow more worthy of punishment than other kinds of violations. This
may be troubling even in terms of Markel's own preferences, for the kinds
of citizens who engage in civil disobedience are often especially
politically engaged and care deeply about civil society even as they
question one of its particular laws. Conversely, if culpable lawbreaking (as
opposed to culpable wrongdoing) forms the desert basis for punishment,
the absence of culpability suggests the absence of desert, so we potentially
need to adopt a far more expansive defense for (reasonable) mistakes of
law or ignorance of law. Markel says such a defense would be fine by
him,'7 but he may need to commit himself to a stronger position; such a
defense, and a rather expansive one at that, might be necessarily entailed
by his theory.
Perhaps Markel takes the view that the responsibilities of
citizenship in a liberal democracy include some obligation to know the
law, and we can properly hold people accountable for their failure to know
it. I tend to think that would be somewhat unfair, at least in the world of
modern criminal codes, which are extremely complicated and cover all
manner of conduct.' 8 It strikes me as more appropriate to place the
obligation on the legislature to pass laws that are knowable, not on the
citizen to know the law. But, where the legislature blunders, must the
unknowing citizens pay the price?
Markel might avoid this issue of culpability altogether by saying
that what is important, and even intrinsically good, about criminal
punishment relates less to the desert of the individual offender than to its
value for society as a whole. Punishment serves as a way for the
community to knit the social fabric more tightly by expressing, promoting,
and strengthening its shared values. He points specifically to equal liberty
and democratic self-defense. I agree that those values are important, but
1 See id. at 39 ("I am sympathetic to a reasonable ignorance of the law excuse.").
8 See generally DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW (2008); Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating
Degradation of American Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633 (2004) [hereinafter
Robinson & Cahill, Accelerating Degradation].
2012] 174
175 Virginia Journal of Criminal Law [Vol. 1:167
we can promote them, even via punishment, whether the specific offender
appreciates our doing so or not. We as a society can communicate to each
other our shared values by imposing punishment on one who violates
them, whether or not we are communicating anything in particular to the
offender by doing so. Indeed, why should we not care more about
communicating with each other than with the offender, who has made
clear by her offense that she does not respect our values?
Markel resists that conclusion-he is quite interested in the
communicative power of punishment vis-A-vis offenders specifically,
rather than its expressive power more broadly-but it is not obvious why
communicating to the offender is more important than communicating to
anyone else. 19 Why not other citizens, or victims, or even other offenders
or would-be offenders who also "hear" the message we send by punishing
this offender? Punishing even recalcitrant (or incompetent) offenders may
serve the goals of the CCR from the perspective of other citizens, who see
it as vindicating their sense of justice, making clear that nobody is above
the law, and protecting the polity and its members.20
19 See Markel, supra note 2, at 26 (describing the offender as "the person most in
need of hearing these messages").
20 Markel seems to take the communicative, relational aspect of punishment (its
sending a message to the offender) to be crucial to the claim about its intrinsic goodness,
whereas its expressive aspect (sending a message to others) must be only instrumentally
good. I am not sure that is so.
First, I think it is useful to distinguish the claim that punishment is intrinsically
good from the claim that punishment advances or creates one or more intrinsic goods. See
supra note 5. I take Markel to claim that accountability, equality, and democratic self-
defense are intrinsic goods promoted by punishment, at least in the right cases.
I am not sure, however, that only communicative punishment promotes those
goods, though I concede it may promote them more, or better, than non-communicative
punishment. Rather, I think Markel's position about the critical importance of
communication versus mere expression might be rooted in the notion of duty, which is
different from the notion of goodness.
If the expressive benefits of punishment are achieved only by imposing hardship
on the offender, then the offender is being used instrumentally, in the sense that he is
being treated as a means to some end whose benefits he does not obtain. We might say
that such punishment violates some duty we owe the offender, and that it is bad or even
morally forbidden on that basis, but that is not the same claim as denying that the
punishment also has features that are intrinsically good. If retributive justice, or
distributive justice, or beauty is an intrinsic good, I would think it remains so irrespective
of the means by which such a good is produced. We can oppose forcing a violinist to play
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In addition to Markel's general understanding of the basis of
punishment, I would like to briefly interrogate his understanding of the
political institutions charged with imposing punishment. One contribution
of the CCR account, which Markel recognizes and rightly identifies as a
significant feature, is that it seeks to encompass not only criminalization
but also enforcement issues. Specifically, it seeks to reassure law enforcers
that it can be acceptable for them to enforce legal norms that do not reflect
any moral wrong.
Indeed, such enforcement might be not only acceptable but
presumptively good.2' Some questions arise as to the strength of the
presumption and how it can be overcome. Markel remains interested in
authorizing some discretion on the part of prosecutors, judges, and
juries-that is, the people charged with implementing the law. But such
discretion might involve: (1) discretion to assess the morality of the law
(or the relative immorality of a particular offender); or (2) discretion to
balance other principled considerations or goals, such as crime prevention,
against the law's morality; or only (3) discretion based on practical
considerations such as resource constraints, evidentiary limitations, and
the like. Markel implies that, as to "dumb but not illiberal" laws, only (2)
and (3) are proper forms of enforcement discretion. I, however, am not
convinced that (1) should not also be within the range of enforcers'
discretion, at least at times, or even how (2) or (3) could be effectuated
without some resort to (1). If prosecutors are expected to exercise
discretion to make tradeoffs necessitated by limited resources, would it not
be acceptable (and perhaps best) for them to make the relevant and
necessary tradeoffs in light of the relative immorality of the offenses, or
the offenders? And quite apart from such tradeoffs, are enforcers expected
a sonata against her will without denying the beauty of the coerced performance if it does
occur. Similarly, one might recognize that punishment, in specific cases or across the
board, will generate various bad consequences, or even breach moral obligations-and
even take those consequences or breaches to weigh decisively against imposing
punishment without denying that it also has good consequences.
Perhaps this line of thinking merely betrays my own consequentialist tendencies
as against Markel's commitment to moral duties, in which case it merely talks past him.
21 See Markel, supra note 2, at 90 92 (agents "may reasonably enforce" dumb
law-i.e., they have "a pro tanto reason" to enforce it); id. at 97 ("[E]xecutive or judicial
officials have a pro tanto reason to enforce and punish violations of criminal laws except
when the laws are spectacularly dumb or illiberal.").
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to prosecute infractions that clearly violate the law but are equally clearly
de minimis as a moral matter, from the viewpoint of any reasonable
person?
These issues are especially noteworthy given that such reasonable
persons may, and hopefully do, include the legislators who enacted the
law to be enforced. In a world such as the one we inhabit, where no
general rule can perfectly capture all and only "bad" behavior (however
one defines "badness"), legislative enactments should not be, and neither
citizens nor legislative bodies should want them to be, the last word as to
who and what should be punished. Even if legislators were capable of
writing laws that capture as best as possible our beliefs about the exact
scope of criminal behavior, legislators could (quite reasonably) choose to
write laws based on different considerations. They might knowingly enact
laws that are overbroad on their face, with the expectation, and even the
hope, that someone else-a prosecutor, judge, or jury-will ensure that no
punishment is imposed on conduct that is legally improper yet morally
blameless. The criminal law's content, moral or otherwise, need not be
dictated ex ante by legislative fiat, but could arise from a dialogue
between the various relevant institutional players (legislature, police,
prosecutors, judges, juries, etc.). Whether or not such a legal system would
be the best (or only genuinely possible) one, that system at least seems
consistent with a sensible account of liberal democracy.
Moreover, quite apart from political theory, as a descriptive matter,
the existing politics of criminal legislation and enforcement certainly seem
consistent with a story of effective, and deliberate, delegation of moral
discretion (one might say more strongly, of de facto criminalization
authority) by legislatures to enforcement agents, judges, and others.22 if
such delegation is either actually extant and forms part of legislatures'
understanding of their own practical role, or if it is consistent with a
22 See e.g., Michael T. Cahill, Punishment Decisions at Conviction: Recognizing
the Jury as Fault-Finder, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 91, 112 ("Offense definitions sweep too
broadly, and penalties reach too high, because legislators expect prosecutors to weed out
the excesses via non-prosecution or plea-bargaining downward-or expect that the
prosecutors, rather than the legislators, will take the blame for any failure to do so.");
Robinson & Cahill, Accelerating Degradation, supra note 18; Paul H. Robinson &
Michael T. Cahill, Can a Model Penal Code Second Save the States from Themselves?, 1
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169, 173-75 (2003) (describing the political pressures on each of the
"players in the criminal justice process").
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normatively acceptable scheme of liberal governance, then it seems
feasible (or even necessary) to recognize that robust exercise of moral
judgment can be part of the institutional role of enforcement officials as
well as legislatures. Indeed, Markel makes clear elsewhere that he
acknowledges the need for discretion, but is simply troubled by
unreviewable discretion.23 In that case, the real issue is less the relation
between the strictures of written law and the consciences of the officials
who enforce it than the relation between the various institutional agents
who collectively bear and share responsibility for the law and its
enforcement-as is entirely appropriate.
23 See Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1460 (2004).
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